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In the mid-nineteenth century, under the pressures of looming European imperi-
alism, Persians saw Iran’s declining economic, social, and political position as the 
result of collective moral degradation.1 Justice had always been a central feature of 
the ideal of civilization, but it was in this period that it acquired the conceptual 
load of modern political discourse, requiring codified law and constitutional gov-
ernment. Justice as rule of law was seen as a necessary prerequisite for the rehabili-
tation of moral refinement that would restore Iran’s place in the hierarchy of 
civilizations. Shame was a central emotion in these conceptual connections, linking 
individual moral abasement to the abrogation of political sovereignty. By the close 
of the nineteenth century, with the rise of mass politics and moveable type printing 
that enlarged the public sphere, emphasis began to shift to the centrality of indi-
vidual moral refinement for the establishment of justice. In this formulation, older 
Persianate ideas of civility, of moral refinement as idealized masculinity, were 
linked to the restoration of civilization by extending the inviolability of masculine 
honour to the national body politic. Similarly, civility had always been conceptu-
ally embedded in ideas of moral refinement, but through the foregrounding of zeal 
and honour, it became inextricably linked to a decidedly national civilization.
This chapter first traces new concepts of civility and civilization articulated in 
Persian against the background of dominant ideas of the time. It then traces the 
changing labour these concepts performed, as arenas of discussion shifted from a 
small, literate elite to a broader audience in the context of increasingly mass move-
ments around the turn of the twentieth century. The starting point is the first 
modernist tract (1859) where, drawing on older Persianate ideas, the justice neces-
sary for civilization was posited as rule of law. During the constitutional period 
(c.1890–1912), Persian modernists foregrounded the cultivation of the individual 
as the means through which justice, increasingly posited as constitutional govern-
ment, could be achieved. This shift was accompanied by calls for increased zeal and 
the preservation of shame in order to inculcate love and devotion to the nation, in 
the name of upholding masculine honour. Moral refinement was framed as the 
cultivation of a modern Iranian manhood.
This early elite language of reform negotiated itself by simultaneously drawing 
on and distinguishing itself from older Persianate ideals of just rule, virtuous con-
duct, and moral refinement. Persian had long been a transregional language of 
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learning, power, and culture from Anatolia to Bengal, leaving the imprint of these 
ideas in languages such as Ottoman Turkish and Urdu. These ideas were not 
limited to the elite sphere, as many epics, stories, poems, moral exempla, scrip-
tures, and various types of theological maxims were well known to those unable to 
read the written word via oral cultures of storytelling, recitation, and group reading 
practices (such as might occur in coffee houses).2 Thus, while the language of re-
form may have taken until the turn of the twentieth century to penetrate the 
popular public sphere, older ideas were far more dominant. As a result, the elite 
language of reform drew on these older ideas for legitimacy, even as it sought to 
refigure them.
Though many reformers engaged with European thought, they encountered this 
thought in largely indirect ways, through intermediate translations or engagement 
with neighbouring elites. Most elites were educated in at least Persian and Arabic, 
if not also Turkish and French. The first major moveable type presses to print Per-
sian language books and newspapers were located in Istanbul and Cairo. The con-
stant circulation of people, texts, and ideas between these places and Iran makes 
the ideas of the tanzimat (see Chapter  5, Ottoman Turkish) and nahda (see 
Chapter 6, Arabic) extremely important. Even less work has been done on links 
between Iran and India in spite of their shared Persian heritage up through the 
nineteenth century.3 By considering these more immediate contexts, many Persian 
conceptual entanglements with French and British thought also become about the 
locales and languages in which these encounters took place.
PERSIAN TERMS AND CONCEPTS
The basic way in which the cultivation of the individual was envisioned in the mid-
nineteenth century was according to the training or refinement (tarbiyat or tahzib) 
of the twofold interrelated moral substance/state (akhlaq) and manner/conduct 
(adab). Conduct was a manifestation of moral substance, defying the notion of an 
inner state existing without its outer manifestation that had accrued to the modern 
English language concept of civility.4 The moral substance/proper conduct com-
plex meant that an individual’s moral substance could be altered through the cul-
tivation of certain behaviours. In practice, this was not always the case, and an 
individual could, at one moment, display proper behaviour and, at the next, dis-
play improper behaviour. But this dissonance was a serial set of behaviours, and the 
idea of an inner state autonomous from outer behaviour was quite alien. This idea 
that individuals were, in substance, how they acted would also animate resistance 
to adoption of European-style reforms in the nineteenth century, since these were 
the practices of non-Muslim polities and peoples.5
The stylistic practice of alternating paired synonyms imbues words with semantic 
meaning. Certain words are semantically grouped through one of their meanings, 
which links the rest of their meanings and the words themselves to a particular con-
cept. The seemingly obvious choice for civility, adab, means conduct, form, or 
manner.6 But other terms mean something similar and are used at least as often. 
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Terms such as a’in (custom, rite), rasm (custom, manner, rule), or ‘adat (customs, 
habits, manners) are also used in synonymous pairings with akhlaq, which is linked 
to adab and its cognates through a shared meaning of ‘manner/conduct’. This prac-
tice of synonymous pairings lays the concept’s semantic field. Furthermore, the 
conceptual indivisibility of moral substance and behavioural manifestation in Per-
sian is evident in the simultaneous meanings inhering in the terms that roughly 
correspond to civility: adab and akhlaq can both mean manners or morals.
In the context of older Persianate ideas, knowledge had long been the corner-
stone of moral perfection, and was linked to ideas about the virtuous conduct of 
individuals and communities. This was because learning was thought to bestow the 
discernment necessary for the practice of moderation, the highest virtue. The 
archetypal community was envisioned as a city and, accordingly, its virtuous 
 inhabitants defined by urbanity (madaniyat or tamaddun). Moderation, as the har-
monious balance of all qualities, was the embodiment of moral refinement, known 
as equity (insaf  ) at the level of the individual and justice (‘adalat) at the level of the 
community. The term vahshi referred to uncultivated states of wildness, savagery, 
and ignorance associated with the urbanite’s opposite, the nomad, whose lack of 
education resulted in rudeness, ignorance, and excess. Virtue was also honourable 
masculinity, and savagery was described in words that also meant a lack of man-
hood. The virtuous man displayed chivalry (futuvvat or javanmardi)—defined by 
the qualities of bravery, generosity, courtesy, and honesty. Qualities and substances, 
virtuous or otherwise, are not the same as emotions. In Persian, moral states are 
categorized under varying degrees of virtues and vices, which can include feelings 
commonly grouped under the category of emotions in English and those that are 
not, such as equity.
Often a European concept was directly transliterated into Persian and then later 
fused with a Persian concept. By the mid-twentieth century, the Lughatnamah, the 
scholar and journalist Ali Akbar Dihkhuda’s (1879–1956) important dictionary, 
lists madaniyat according to its old definition of city or urbanity.7 The specific fla-
vour of urbanity is reflected in its other reference to Medina, which, as the site of 
the first Islamic community living under the Prophet Muhammad’s rule, serves as 
the model of justice and virtue.8 Dihkhuda also links madaniyat to tamaddun, a 
word defined as ‘the manner of the character (akhlaq) of the inhabitants of a city: 
the transformation from roughness, uncouthness and ignorance to states of refine-
ment, sociability, and learning’.9 Thus, tamaddun was at once the ideal of urbanity 
and the process by which one arrived at the qualities of such an ideal. By contrast, 
many late nineteenth-century writers used tamaddun and madaniyat interchange-
ably. In a secondary definition linking the two words as urbanity, Dihkhuda glosses 
madaniyat with the transliterated word civilisé, reflecting a fusion of Persianate 
urbanity with the French idea of being civilized.10 Before this early twentieth-
century fusion, French and English concepts of civilization existed uneasily along-
side Persian ones. This unease was a product of cultural politics, whose debates 
refigured and redeployed the older concept of a morally refined urbanity, with its 
attendant ideas of just rule and virtuous manhood, to address the new challenges 
of European imperialism and civilizational hierarchy.
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KNOWLEDGE, L AW, AND ORDER AS JUSTICE 
IN THE ELITE SPHERE
After decades of Russian and British military and economic encroachment through 
the nineteenth century, most elites in Iran agreed there was a problem, but reli-
gious scholars, nobles, government officials, and various thinkers diverged on how 
to address it.11 Modernist writers preserved the status of knowledge as a pre-
requisite to the happiness and prosperity that were marks of a justly ruled kingdom, 
but sought to redefine what constituted knowledge itself. For some this was 
technological and administrative reform, and for others it was about deeper social 
and political changes, such as increased literacy and expansion of government con-
trol over areas traditionally the domain of the ‘ulama (religious classes).12 The arts 
and sciences that had enabled Europe to advance in such a way to be able to 
threaten Iran’s sovereignty needed to be adopted, though how was a severely con-
tested issue. The semantic range of the oft-invoked term islah, sometimes used as 
reform towards European-style modernity and sometimes as renewal according to 
an Islamic ideal, is one indication of the highly varied and contested nature of con-
cepts at this time. Some called for justice defined as monarchic rule through con-
sultation, a familiar idea, with virtuous overtones echoing both the political 
practices of the early Islamic community and the figure of the wise minister in 
Persian political advice literature.13 For others, consultation more explicitly curbed 
the king’s power in the form of a constitutional monarchy. Confusion over the 
meaning of terms had far-reaching political consequences in the course of the 
Constitutional Revolution (1906–11), such as a civil war (1908–09) and the crys-
tallization of sharp political factions that continued to haunt Iranian society 
through the twentieth century.
In his Letters of Kamal al-Dawlah, Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadah (1812–78), an Azeri 
atheist intellectual in Tbilisi, provides an explanation of a set of terms transliter-
ated from European languages that demonstrate reformist terms of engage-
ment.14 His first term is despot, defined as ‘a king whose actions are not bound 
to any law and who exercises complete authority over the property and lives of the 
people without limit or restriction’. These are actions that manifest the particular 
state of   such a king, who ‘always behaves according to his own selfish desires 
(hava-yi nafs)’. The ‘people under his rule, will be mean and contemptible slaves, 
and entirely excluded from the legal rights of freedom and humanity’. A ruler 
whose state is defined by the lusts of his base passions is one whose subjects are 
themselves reduced to base and contemptible states, rendering them outside the 
bounds of humanity.
According to Akhundzadah, the way out of this wretched state is civilization, 
defined as ‘the salvation of a people from ignorance and savagery’, through ‘the 
attainment of necessary learning for the affairs of living, arriving at the degree of 
perfection in the sciences and arts, refining character (tahzib-i akhlaq) as much as 
possible, and manifesting excellence in the forms urbanity (adab-i tamaddun)’.15 
Civilization is not just the equivalent of tamaddun, rather it is morally elevated 
character manifested through excellence of urbane comportment, in opposition to 
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the default state of ignorance and savagery. Such refinement comes from mastery 
of the arts and sciences, as well as the learning necessary for handling worldly 
 affairs adroitly. Similarly, Akhundzadah defines progress as ‘when men seek salva-
tion from the state of ignorance and wildness and labour in the multitude of sci-
ences, arts and beliefs which are necessary for advancement (taraqqi)’.16 This idea 
of advancement is one that means improvement with implications of hierarchy, 
though it came to explicitly mean civilizational progress.
Persian modernists attributed Iran’s perceived backwardness and vulnerability to 
a lack of justice in government and society, and of individual equity. In Persian 
ethico-didactic literature, individual equity meant proper proportion of various 
qualities, and justice in the polity meant the order brought about by proper prac-
tice of power and administration. Justice and unity were linked, since ‘lack of 
justice is the antagonistic plurality of extremes’. Unity was the balance of moder-
ation, or the synthesis of extremes.17 The king was central to this idea of order. He 
was to sit above the polity and keep different groups in their proper place. Thus, 
good rulership resulted in justice and order, and its lack resulted in injustice and 
chaos.18 According to the norms of adab, in their calls for reformed administra-
tion, modernist texts extolled the king, reserving their attacks for government offi-
cials. Novel in these writings was that, without systemized laws and ordered 
administration, the ruler himself was not enough for justice to prevail in the 
kingdom. And without justice, there could be no safety for the kingdom, or peace, 
happiness, and or prosperity for the people.19
It is difficult to date many of the treatises, books, and articles discussed in this 
chapter since a number circulated first as manuscripts and/or lithographs. Many 
were later reprinted during the Constitutional Revolution, gaining wider reader-
ships, and revitalizing their relevance to early twentieth-century public spheres.20 
Mirza Malkum Khan (1833–1908), an Armenian convert to Islam who was edu-
cated in Paris and Istanbul and spent many years in Qajar diplomatic service, au-
thored one of the earliest reformist tracts, ‘Kitabchah-yi Ghaybi’ (1859).21 The 
‘Kitabchah’ was one of the first texts to articulate the importance of a codified body 
of law and regulated administrative procedure, clearly inspired by the Ottoman 
tanzimat. Circulated anonymously after the dismissal of the conservative chief 
minister, Mirza Aqa Khan Nuri, the ‘Kitabchah’ is addressed to the leaders of the 
government, painting a picture of a kingdom ‘afflicted by [other] governments 
from all sides and bogged down in all kinds of baseness’.22 Malkum criticizes the 
negligence and lack of restraint that results in corruption and mismanagement, 
and notes that Nuri’s resistance to change had been justified with the refrain that 
Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834) had already established the proper balance of gov-
ernment. But Malkum argues that it has been more like five hundred, rather than 
just thirty, years since Fath Ali Shah’s time: the historical and geopolitical changes 
in Asia, as well as Europe’s technological advances, have made older ways of exer-
cising government power obsolete. The world has quickened its pace of develop-
ment and Iran has fallen out of temporal synchronicity with the rest of the world.23
To combat the imminent existential threat to Iran from the Russians and British, 
Malkum proposed new measures, which he claimed could not be found in Arabic 
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terms, neighbouring polities, or ancestral models. Rather, ‘what we need is science 
and perception’ to discern new ways of legal and administrative order. The func-
tion of science was to enable the development of perception, a type of under-
standing located in the heart, for ‘intellect (‘aql ) alone is not enough for governing 
in these times’.24 Needed were ‘zeal (ghayrat) and statesmanship’ to ‘light a fire in 
the heart’ of government officials.25 This call to cultivate zeal linked the kingdom 
of Iran’s state to a crisis of honourable masculinity, which was also a crisis of mor-
ality. In sufficient quantities, zeal counteracted its opposite, negligence, and motiv-
ated the pursuit of science (systematized knowledge), which would give rise to the 
perception required to save Iran from collective abasement. But this call was 
limited to government elites alone.
Yik Kalamah (1870), written by the lifelong Qajar government servant Mirza 
Yusif Khan (d. 1895), presents a codified system of law as the basic principle 
 necessary for Iran’s progress.26 Like many other reformists, Yusif Khan frames 
his  recommendations as derived from his experiences abroad in Russia, the 
Caucasus, Istanbul, France, and England, the latter two of which he presents as 
most accomplished in the attributes of civilization. He poses the problem, that 
if  ‘justice and equity are the foundations of the faith of Islam . . . why have we 
remained so backwards?’27 The way to bring Iran within the ‘circle of civilization’ 
was to wake ‘from the sleep of negligence’, consider ‘the state of advancement of 
other peoples’, and undertake the necessary prerequisite transformations, other-
wise the ‘zealous leaders of Muslims’, will be ashamed to give account of them-
selves on the Day of Judgement.28 Progress, order, and systemized law are posed 
in opposition to idleness, carelessness, and lethargy, and linked to states of mascu-
line honour/dishonour. Significantly, shame is evoked as a deterrent to continuing 
negligence.
In Yik Kalamah, the sciences and arts, defined in technological terms, are the 
results of progress, and must not be confused with its prerequisite, which is qanun, 
or a codified system of all laws and procedures relating to worldly matters. It is 
systemization and standardization that defines qanun, not its specific content. In 
European countries, no single individual can act according to their own selfish de-
sires in judicial and punitive matters because the people and the government to-
gether undertake this rule of law.29 Yusif Khan then argues that shari‘a (divinely 
based law) should be similarly codified, so that the complementary religious and 
worldly law can function as intended. In an act of transplantational translation, he 
then introduces, interprets, and justifies aspects of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man as a worthy example of the worldly portion of codified law, using 
theological and juridical sources, such as the Qur’an and Traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad.30 But in this reading of French law, the realm of worldly matters was 
far larger than was the case in Iran, eliciting staunch criticism from some ‘ulama to 
this and similar proposals for legal reform.31 Properly codified law can guard 
against its abrogation, against injustice, by protecting it from the vagaries of base 
desires.
While some, like Malkum Khan and Yusif Khan, attempted to allay fears of 
compromising the Islamic character of Iran by finding Islamic roots for proposed 
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European-style reforms, others, like Akhundzadah, created the basis of legitimacy 
for wholesale Europeanization in a pre-Islamic Iranian culture decoupled from and 
set in opposition to religion. Iran was isolated from ‘world civilization’ by the Arab 
invasion and supposedly forced conversion to Islam. This model of history, out-
lining an ancient ‘golden age’ followed by a slow decline commencing with the 
advent of Islam, reflected a new historical sensibility influenced by neo-Zoroastrian 
cosmology and Orientalist scholarship.32 For Akhundzadah, culture was racialized 
and Islam was the culture of the savage Arabs. The dissonance created by its impos-
ition on the more refined Persians was what caused Iran’s civilizational backward-
ness.33 Restoration of Iran’s pre-eminent civilizational position required a 
cultivation of virtues that could not proceed without ‘levelling the foundational 
beliefs of religion, which has become a curtain over the insight of people and pre-
vented them from advancements in worldly matters’.34
Akhundzadah was nearly alone in posing Islam as an obstacle to progress, some-
thing many in his time understood to be an unabashed embrace of a European 
viewpoint.35 Muslim modernists such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani’ 
(1838/39–1897) and Baha’i leaders like Mirza ‘Abbas Nuri ‘Abd al-Baha’ (1844–
1921) espoused the view that Islam was progressive. Both figures addressed tran-
sregional audiences and grounded their reformist ideas in a religion refigured 
through early nineteenth-century Shaykhi/Babi interpretations of the related illu-
minationist (ishraqi) and moral (akhlaqi) philosophy.36 They both take Persianate 
ideas of individual moral refinement and translate them into new concepts of civ-
ilization, which require the restraint of selfish desires and the cultivation of vir-
tuous states.
Afghani is best remembered for his propagation of what has been called pan-
Islamism, an ideology of resistance to European imperialism propagating self-
strengthening by recourse to a rationalist Islam under the banner of Muslim 
political unity.37 Afghani’s most famous Persian treatise, Haqiqat-i Mazhab-i Nay-
chiri va Bayan-i Hal-i Naychiriyan (The truth about the naturist sect and an 
 explanation of their state) was composed after his encounter with Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan’s (see Chapter 8, Urdu) followers in Hyderabad (1880–82).38 The treatise 
outlines three beliefs and three qualities produced by religion, which together 
formed the ‘six-sided castle of human happiness’ that was the foundation of civil-
ization.39 The first belief is that man is the noblest of creatures, which resulted in 
his ‘disdain for bestial qualities’. The more this disdain took hold, the greater the 
individual’s progress in the intellectual sphere, which was a measure of his ‘ascent 
on the ladder of civilization’. At the top of this ladder are ‘civilized, virtuous men 
whose life with brothers who have reached this rung of civilization is based on love, 
wisdom and justice’, an arrangement that is ‘the summit of human happiness’.40 
The second belief is ‘the certainty that his community is the noblest one’ and that 
all others are ‘in error and deviation’. This belief manifested the result that the in-
dividual will ‘enter into rivalry and competition with other communities’ in intel-
lectual, spiritual, and material virtues. Unlike beasts who do not strive to change 
or improve themselves, ‘such an individual will never be satisfied with decline, 
baseness, or ignobility for himself and his community’. This belief protected 
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against apathy, described as a lack of striving and a weakness in zeal, which, 
 unchecked, would result in ‘slavery, humiliation and abasement’. The third belief 
is that there is a Day of Judgement, which caused the individual to ‘always strive to 
improve and enlighten his mind with true science and sound knowledge’. This last 
belief is ‘the best impulse toward civilization, whose foundations are true know-
ledge and refined morals’ and ‘the best requisite for the stability of the social order’. 
Because the pursuit of moral refinement requires ‘truthful and honest observation 
of the bounds of human intercourse’, this belief is the motive for peaceful and ami-
able international relations.41
The first quality produced by religion, shame (haya’ ), is fundamental to the 
 social order, because it prevents men from ‘committing acts that would cause foul-
ness and disgrace’, and instils a ‘reluctance to take on qualities that are considered 
to violate the world of humanity’. Shame heralds awareness of the nature of vir-
tues, and motivates the proper conduct to manifest them. Shame is the ‘basis of 
good order in human relations’ and, without it, the two other qualities, trust-
worthiness and honesty, cannot exist. It is necessary for the ‘bond of human alli-
ances, associations and societies, since an alliance within a group takes place only 
when the rules are maintained’, which shame ensures. Shame is also critical be-
cause it generates pride or zeal, two characteristics that ‘are the cause of the progress 
of nation’, without which a community would ‘forever remain in a state of lowli-
ness, baseness, humiliation, poverty and subjection’.42 For Afghani, shame is the 
antithesis of humiliation, because it signals the presence of discernment and gen-
erates zeal towards the pursuit of virtue.
In contrast, regardless of their diverse roles, Naychiris undermined religion’s be-
liefs and qualities by seeking to set aside social hierarchies and laws, causing shame 
to disappear. This would lead to the moral degradation of individuals and society 
and eventually to political conquest. Afghani defined Naychiris as those who only 
believed in the material world, appearing as secularists, heretics, reformers, mys-
tics, or revolutionaries. Such a definition linked classical tropes of chaos-inducing 
heretics with the particular type of modernizing reformer who advocated cultural 
emulation of Europe.43
‘Abd al-Baha, the eldest son and successor of Bahullah, founder of the Baha’i 
religion, anonymously authored Risalah-yi Madaniyat (1875).44 Drawing heavily 
on Arab and Ottoman reformists (see Chapters 5, Ottoman Turkish, and 
Chapter  6, Arabic), such as Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi and Namik Kemal, he outlines a 
complex relationship between religion and progress.45 In addition to the Qur’an 
and Traditions, ‘Abd al-Baha draws on a wide variety of sources in keeping with his 
universalist message, such as the Bible, pre-Islamic Persian history, Persian litera-
ture, Greek history, and the works of the Shi’i Imam ‘Ali and the American intel-
lectual, John William Draper. While ‘Abd al-Baha advocated the adoption of some 
European and Japanese scientific and social reforms, he characterizes European 
culture as superficial and morally bankrupt because of Europe’s constant warfare 
and imperialist aggression. He argued that partial borrowing from Europe would 
not compromise the Islamic character of Iran, since ‘most of the civilization (tama-
ddun) of Europe is derived from Islam’.46
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Written in response to the modernization efforts of the early 1870s, the Risalah 
specifically evokes the idea of renewal (islah): that in every age mankind will refine 
his community using reason and knowledge.47 As with Afghani, the centrality of 
knowledge to this renewal reflects the influence of Persian illuminationist phil-
osophy that prized the intellect.48 The Risalah frames Islam’s divinely illuminated 
knowledge as responsible for the transformation of the wild inhabitants of Mecca 
and Medina from a state of ignorance to a state of learning, so that ‘they shone like 
stars of happiness and civilization and became the centre of arts, wisdom, sciences, 
and human perfection’. Individual moral reform undertaken for the greater good 
is the basis of community progress in the Risalah. Virtues derived from new ‘useful’ 
knowledge and reformed religion were to be the engine for this progress. With 
faith and education, the Iranian nation could reform itself by making progress to-
wards a just society. The end point is a vision similar to other reformers, by the end 
of which Iran would (once again) be the ‘world-revealing mirror of world civiliza-
tion (madaniyat)’.49
The Risalah describes perfection as the acquisition of science and knowledge, 
existence of justice, and selflessness in the cause of educating the populace.50 
This perfection is built on particular qualities specific to people of faith, such 
as equity, compassion, generosity, truthfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness, love, 
courtesy, zeal, and humanity (insaniyat).51 The control of the passions (hava), 
whose cultivation in the proper amounts results in a balance, produces these 
moral qualities (akhlaq). Such continuous cultivation is important because even 
the most perfect individual can be driven to abasement by ‘following their pas-
sions until their pleasing qualities leave the form of moderation and are cast into 
the region of excess’.52 Thus, a prerequisite of civilization was a careful cultiva-
tion of particular qualities, manifest through proper conduct to preserve temper-
ance (iʽtidal ).
For ‘Abd al-Baha, the learning of civilization was a mobile light, available for the 
benefit of everyone, both in Europe and Asia, East and West. ‘Abd al Baha’s equa-
tion of learning with light was something shared with other nineteenth-century 
writers.53 For Malkum Khan, Iran was merely uninformed of methods of exe-
cuting its law that ‘world progress’ had invented after much trial and error.54 
Drawing on Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Malkum Khan understood progress as 
civilization itself, echoing Comtean positivism’s motto of ‘love as principle, order 
as basis, progress as end’. Comte’s emphasis on science as a necessity to achieve 
order and then progress, was a notion also intelligible in older Persianate terms.55 
This selective adoption of ideas interpreted in ways that resonate strongly with 
Persianate concepts is a hallmark of modernist writing.56
In conservative nineteenth-century court and clerical circles, authority was 
considered split between the rulers and the ‘ulama, who were interdependent 
purveyors of order and knowledge, respectively: ‘The mutual enemies of both 
Shah and ‘ulama were the seditious within and aggressors without.’57 Tradition-
ally, the archetypal seditious figure was the heretic, while the aggressor was the 
tribal nomad. From the mid-nineteenth century, the figure of the ‘Babi, real or 
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imagined’, became synonymous with the heretic.58 After the Babi Movement declared 
itself a new religion, led an armed uprising against the Qajar state, and attempted to 
assassinate the Shah, accusations of religious heresy became associated with political 
radicalism.59 Republican ideals were associated with fitnah, or the sedition of irre-
ligion and socio-political chaos.60 Thus, from the very beginning, representative 
government was associated with the ignoble and terrifying repercussions of fitnah, 
backlit by the Babi uprisings and their ongoing repression.
Because the concept of justice was so tied to order, even modernist writers re-
garded the Babis/Baha’is as a threat to unity, order, and reason. Akhundzadah saw 
religion as antithetical to reason due to the ostensibly superstitious nature of its 
beliefs and practices, with Babism as a recent manifestation of such fanaticism.61 
He explicitly evokes Thomas Buckle (see Chapter 2, Great Britain), Voltaire, and 
Ernest Renan (see Chapter 3, France) in linking religion, oppression, and back-
wardness.62 Akhundzadah contended that Europe’s freedom of expression engen-
dered rational debate, which deterred the formation of irrational movements like 
Babism.63 Malkum Khan characterized the Babis as a ‘blind movement in the 
crowd’, that resulted in nothing but bloodshed.64 Afghani explicitly linked Babis 
to Naychiris, whom he described as creating moral corruption and social chaos, 
leading to political enslavement and civilizational dissolution. Even in term of 
counter-concepts, older Persianate ideas of individual virtue were used to craft new 
concepts of civilization that were indigenized, built on the scaffolding of older pol-
itical ethics of justice and order.
INDIVIDUAL CULTIVATION IN THE GROWING  
PUBLIC SPHERE
Nineteenth-century modernists called upon the valorized masculine qualities of 
zeal, devotion, and lofty aspiration (himmat) to mobilize their audiences towards 
action. Calls to cultivate lofty aspiration were part of a broader appeal for a 
self-sacrificing civic ethic to engender collective progress towards justice. Lofty as-
piration was set directly in contrast to the loathsome behaviour of selfishness, a 
sign of being ruled by one’s uncontrolled passions. To achieve lofty aspiration, one 
needed to cultivate zeal in the proper amount and to the right end; lack of zeal re-
sulted in debased manhood and was generally perceived to be one cause of Iran’s 
civilizational backwardness. Increasingly, these terms took on a nationalist tone, as 
the millat, previously a religiously defined community, became the Iranian nation, 
whose members were distinguished by their devotion to and love of homeland.65 
Shame at the lack of zeal was invoked to generate the moral refinement necessary 
to recoup a rearticulated concept of masculine honour.
The emphasis on the individual was not entirely new but became dominant 
during the constitutional period (1890–1912). Earlier, Akhundzadah had argued 
that it was incumbent on ‘the wise ones of the community’, to restore ‘the excel-
lence of the people and the guardianship of the homeland . . . by repelling that kind 
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of baseness that is the product of the imprisonment and deprivation of freedom’. 
Baseness was repelled through:
propagation of the sciences all through the equity of the people and sowing of the seed 
of zeal, honour (namus), fellow-feeling, and service to the homeland in the field of 
their mind’s thoughts, since all of these qualities are attributes of manliness and chiv-
alry, so much so that the powerful nations of Europe at this time are endowed by these 
qualities.66
Calls to the Iranian people need to be understood in this light, as made to the elite 
to guide the reform of the people. This was an old logic; it was the reference points 
of these qualities that were new. Akhundzadah calls for the cultivation of zeal to 
protect the self and the community. Namus, a specific kind of masculine honour 
dependent on the chastity of one’s women, gave this protection meaning by con-
necting self and community. By the constitutionalist era, individual masculine 
honour was linked to the honour of the national community through this prin-
ciple of inviolateness, and political reform in the defence of sovereignty became an 
act of masculine virtue.67
This shift in emphasis coincided with the rise of mass politics in Iran. In 1890, 
Nasir al-Din Shah granted a British company a monopoly on the purchase of in-
digenous tobacco and the sale of tobacco products in Iran. In response, mass pol-
itical mobilizations inside and outside of Iran resulted in a boycott of tobacco, 
forcing the Shah to repeal the concession in 1892. The Tobacco Protests also 
 resulted in the formation of secret societies and brought together ‘ulama, re-
formers, merchants, and common people for the first time, in ways which would 
be repeated and expanded upon during the Constitutional Revolution.68
Malkum Khan’s dissident newspaper, Qanun (1890–98), commented on the 
Tobacco Protests, presenting an ideal patriot as one who did not relinquish his 
country to the sensual pleasures (hazz-i nafs) of others.69 Not knowing that the 
land of Iran belonged to its inhabitants resulted in ‘not only the silent acceptance 
of all manner of oppression and disgrace’, but a situation in which people ‘fall to 
the dirt before any unmanly/ignoble leader and confirm in a thousand types of 
womanly ways that the servants of that leader “have particular right to whatever we 
have—possessions, life, honour” ’. They have ‘only recently become aware that this 
is not how the justice and law of God works’.70 The protection of one’s own 
country was presented as part of the maintenance of masculine honour and part of 
a divinely sanctioned order. By the late nineteenth century, the kingdom of Iran 
was envisioned as both a mother to protect and a beloved to possess, on whose be-
half its male citizens must strive.71 Civility and the subject of civilization were thus 
specifically masculine, constituted through possessing and protecting. Qanun fur-
ther elaborated that the Tobacco Protests taught Iranians that ‘the real possessors of 
this land are the people of this land’, and this knowledge had caused ‘the sound of 
adamiyat to grow ever louder in all provinces of Iran’.72 Adamiyat is commonly 
translated as humanity, but it is clear that Malkum Khan meant mankind, since a 
quality of adamiyat is manliness (mardanigi). Women are discussed as objects of 
education because they rear children, and men are called upon to instil love for zeal 
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(not zeal itself ) in women so that they can be the ornament of humanity.73 Men, 
defined by their zeal and honour, were made the active agents of civilization. Later 
newspapers echo these sentiments. An article in Tamaddun entitled, ‘The Liber-
ation of Iran is Entrusted to the Self-Sacrifice of Iranians’, written just after the 
monarchical coup put an end to the first parliament (1908), explicitly addressed 
itself to ‘national brothers’.74 This exclusivity only began to change with women’s 
participation in the Constitutional Revolution, when they too claimed masculine 
qualities such as zeal, opening the gendered concept of civility to contestation.75
One of Qanun’s main projects was for elite reformers and commoners to see 
themselves unified as participants in the same project of healing the ailing body 
politic. The elite were to help instil this zeal for reform and devotion to the nation 
in commoners, so that this work could be undertaken.76 The inaugural issue of 
Qanun calls for the leaders of society—‘ulama and men of the pen—to spread the 
word to the people through schools and pulpits, in the streets and marketplaces, 
about the benefits of qanun and the need for unity.77 They must also instil the 
meaning of qanun in the men’s hearts, so that any sacrifice, even of their lives, will 
not be beyond them.78 Ideals of masculinity were leveraged to bring people to a 
state of civic participation and patriotic zeal.
Kitab-i Ahmad, by ‘Abd al-Rahim Tabrizi Talibov (1834–1911), addressed the 
wider public that it sought to reform. Though he lived most of his life in the 
Caucasus, his influential work won him a seat in Iran’s first parliamentary elections 
(1906).79 Kitab-i Ahmad was inspired by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, and is 
written in the form of daily conversations between the narrator and his young son 
on a wide range of modern forms of knowledge such as science, religion, politics, 
and history. From the 1890s, it was used as a textbook in many new schools estab-
lished in Tehran.80 In the preface, Talibov notes that mankind (insan) has been 
distinguished from wild beasts by the pursuit of enquiry into the causes and truth 
of things. Talibov presents his work as an introduction to the new sciences and arts 
in order to increase perception and provide education. He ends by noting that he 
has written and published this work with the humble hope of reform (islah) for 
the reader, identified as moral refinement through appropriate education.81 This 
appropriate education was the prerequisite for the rule of law and its ensuing pro-
gress, enabling Iran to protect her sovereignty from colonial encroachment.
The way in which knowledge of new arts and sciences was seen to transform the 
character and comportment of individuals was represented in the title character’s 
own transformation. Each chapter was a day in Ahmad’s education, recording 
what he learned, as well as its effects. Ahmad waits respectfully for his father to 
speak to him, makes everyone laugh with his witty comments, but laughs himself 
sparingly. He also accordingly instructs his sister on appropriate instances and 
volume for laughter when she laughs too loudly in proportion to his joke.82 The 
sister benefits from the moral refinement of male members of the family through 
outward instruction, but does not herself learn the modern knowledge that enacts 
substantive transformation.
In a review of Kitab-i Ahmad, Sayyid Asadullah Tabataba’i Nazim al-Dawlah, 
the chief consul of Iran in Istanbul, introduces the book by invoking islah, whereby 
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reading this book ‘the common man finds moral refinement (tahzib-i akhlaq) and 
is educated away from ignorance towards wisdom and perspicacity’.83 Talibov is 
described as having lofty, high-minded aspirations and the book is written so that 
both young and old can benefit from its wisdom. The inextricability of style and 
substance is recognized when Tabataba’i notes that, in the expression of complex 
matters, Talibov has ‘carefully observed proper form (adab)’, meaning that ‘he has 
written so pleasingly that from reading and hearing the work, any zealous man 
devoted to the nation will sing the melody of the ecstatic mystic (vajd va sama‘-i 
astin bar afshandah), and acquire hopeful expectations for the future’.84 The work 
of aesthetics thus evokes an ecstatic state—vajd is love as ecstasy and sama‘ is the 
ecstasy evoked by music—whose infusion can rectify the deficit of hope. With 
hope restored, the zealous patriot can work towards bettering the future.
The 1905 Japanese victory over Russia provoked new discussions about the 
proper ways to maintain Iranian sovereignty in the face of imperial pressures. Japan 
was seen to have successfully reformed its institutions and joined the ranks of civ-
ilized countries without losing its own religion and culture.85 In Masa’il al-Hayat 
(1906) Talibov included a translation and explanation of Japan’s Meji constitution. 
Preceding the translation is a discussion on the nature of law and the need for a 
constitutional government that is indicative of the relationship between individual 
equity and just rule, religion, and law. Talibov explains political justice in medical 
language, as a restoration of the body-politic’s humoural balance to bring the state’s 
various parts in harmony according to proper limits. Likewise, the individual 
needed to have the correct amount of certain qualities in order to achieve equity. 
In this vein, Talibov describes qanun as the treatment for excess, likening it to the 
chains required to restrain madness and restore moderation to an individual’s dis-
position: ‘Since a person is a limb of the body of society, administering the illness 
of a single disposition is healing the whole body of society. And if society is not 
quickly healed of its excesses, it will be the exciter of corruption in all the limbs of 
civilization.’86 Health is a metaphor for the moderation that defines a virtuously 
ruled society, which is constituted by the equity of its individuals.
The link between the individual and society is the law. Talibov presents divine 
law (shari‘a) as perfect for individuals since it makes manifest the path to God 
through its well-known limits. At the level of society, its corollary is qanun.87 It is 
complementary to shari‘a and moderates the collective disposition because qanun 
is imbued with the divine law’s spirit through ‘the imprint of the heavenly words’, 
since ‘the sound of society is the sound of God’. But unlike the individual’s obedi-
ence to shari‘a, ‘these laws will be followed not because of fear of retribution or 
hope of forgiveness, but rather from the shame (infi‘al ) of collective attention on 
the illness of deficiency and intemperance of rebellion’.88 Talibov sets adherence to 
the shari‘a as a model for individual virtue, which is transmuted to the realm of 
society through collective democratic will, ideally manifesting as a constitutional 
monarchy. Unlike Yusif Khan, Talibov did not justify this form of government ac-
cording to the Qur’an and Traditions. Rather, qanun itself, because it was the col-
lective will of a shari‘a-abiding community, corresponded to the will of God. 
Justice had become a principle whose form was open, even to the model of a 
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country like Japan that did not profess a monotheistic religion. Talibov prefaces 
the constitution by calling upon all ‘homeland-loving and monarch-devoted Iran-
ians to comprehend the meaning of the law and what it means for it to pervade the 
people’s moral refinement (tahzib-i akhlaq) . . . since where ever there is no law in 
the land, there is no happiness or prosperity’. The pairing of love of homeland and 
devotion to the king is an indication of the Japanese constitution’s appeal, with its 
heavy emphasis on the centrality of the emperor (see Chapter 12, Japanese).89 At 
the same time, this was a call for a new kind of Iranian civilization, where Islamic 
law moulded virtuous individuals to establish a virtuous polity that was both 
democratic and retained the monarchy.
The quality of zeal, envisioned as the source of strength, virtue, and wealth, 
linked manhood with the virtues of sovereignty in a global order of nation-states. 
Colonial domination was linked to a lack of zeal, resulting in a physical and eco-
nomic weakness that was likened to emasculation.90 This weak, indigent, abject 
manhood defined the lower extreme of acceptable masculinity, while the excesses 
of its opposite were often characterized as European behaviours. Both colonized 
and colonizer stood for dishonourable forms of manhood. Talibov’s narrator rhet-
orically marks the behaviours outside the limits of acceptable masculinity by 
asking, ‘what group of wild beasts’ engages in the mass slaughter of its own kind? 
This was a critique of mass, modernized warfare, described as armed aggression 
across vast battlefields and grotesquely high loss of life.91 Such collective behaviour 
was mirrored in individual behaviour, as Talibov’s narrator later asks:
which savage clothes his daughters and women in clothes with low necklines . . . takes 
them to a social gathering and gives them over to the embrace of young men for dan-
cing? If the girl adorns herself imperfectly, her mother dismisses her, [saying] ‘Sofia or 
Maria, today you are not so beguiling, the daughter of Mrs. So-and-so appears more 
beautiful than you.’ Such claims of civilization (madaniyat) and honour are a specific, 
meaning European, [kind of ] dishonour (bi-namusi va sharaf) that they know as and 
call civilization (sivilizatsi’un).92
By drawing a distinction between Muslim madaniyat and European ‘sivilizatsi’un’, 
represented as the dishonoured manhood of allowing one’s women to be soiled by 
the gaze of unrelated men, hetero-social customs that Europeans posed as civiliza-
tion were mocked as behaviour beneath even savages or animals. This is after a 
spirited promotion of the wonders of European sciences, technologies, and gov-
ernmental systems, demonstrating the limit according to which madaniyat, posited 
as masculine honour embedded in a homo-social gendered order, could emulate 
Europe.93 Talibov articulated a modernity that was neither European, colonizing, 
nor colonized, but one which posed Islam as culture, and was articulated according 
to a specifically Persian shape in Iran.
Not all modernists agreed with Talibov. Some thought that traditional forms of 
gender segregation and veiling were impediments to women’s, and thus society’s, 
progress. But even Akhundzadah thought a woman should be unveiled only until 
married, to help facilitate her education, after which she should cover herself, stay 
indoors, and refrain from socializing with unrelated men in order to protect her 
Dictionary: NOSD
0002515806.INDD   159 4/9/2015   6:32:23 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 04/09/2015, SPi
160 Moral Refinement and Manhood in Persian
husband’s honour.94 Through the constitutionalist period, it was the perceived ig-
norance and superstition amongst women that was the object of reform, not the 
homo-social order of society, even amongst women themselves.95 Issues around 
men’s appearance were far more contested. Some secular reformers articulated 
 unqualified adoption of European dress, epitomized by shaving of the beard, an 
uncovered head, and the necktie. For others this adoption was as problematic for 
men as for women, partly due to different conceptualizations of the relationship 
between Islam and Iranian civilization. By contrast, namus was overwhelmingly 
central to modernist concepts of progress and civilization.
The 1912 Russian political ultimatum and military occupation, a series of 
 internal armed conflicts, and the Second World War Allied invasion and occupa-
tion of Iran precipitated a shift in reformist discourses.96 The language of modern 
science began to replace older notions of virtue and knowledge as the basis for 
 reform, picking up pace with Pahlavi state-building in the 1920s.97
From the mid-nineteenth century, discussions around civilization drew on 
older Persianate concepts of political justice and individual virtue. Early elite dis-
courses initially emphasized political, legal, and administrative reforms at the 
level of the state as necessary prerequisites to enable the cultivation of individual 
equity. In this context, calls for increased zeal were addressed to elites, who would 
enact these reforms and then lead the way for the masses. Around the turn of the 
twentieth century, elites began to address a wider population and individuals out-
side the elite began to participate in the burgeoning public sphere, as mass pub-
lishing and political mobilization spread. Rule of law was increasingly proposed 
as constitutional government, representing a new, nationally conceived, commu-
nity that required a new kind of civilized citizen. Modernist calls for zeal were 
made to motivate the pursuit of knowledge in order to obtain perception, which 
would generate the shame, and love of and devotion to the country, necessary for 
moral refinement. A constitutional monarchy’s rule of law would then be strong 
enough to resist imperial encroachment externally and chaos internally, mani-
festing moral refinement.
In spite of women’s participation and gendered contestations in mass politics, 
this moral refinement remained largely masculine and juxtaposed to a despised 
femininity. Older notions of misogyny were modernized; individual moral refine-
ment was seen to bring the virtue of justice to the body politic through the concept 
of an explicitly masculine honour. Because the manner of this moral refinement 
needed to be modern, but not European, honourable manhood depended on the 
gendered homo-social order of society that came to be defined as the core of Iranian 
civilization.
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